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Nationality Aspects of the Hong Kong Settlement
Robin M. White*
Nationality is commonly defined as the "legal tie between an individual
and a state" or as "membership of a state."'1 Whether this is a satis-
factory definition is a question which cannot be discussed here. Tradi-
tionally in U.K. law, nationality has been said to reflect a reciprocal
relationship whereby the Crown offers protection, and the subject alle-
giance.2 This begs even more questions.' The Hong Kong settlement
views nationality as concerning not only diplomatic and consular protec-
tion (a traditional international law view), but also fights of travel and
immigration.
I. NATIONALITY LAW AND HONG KONG
A. U.K. Nationality Law'
The law today is confusing, and is best explained historically. De-
spitd complications and anomalies, U.K. nationality law before the mid-
dle of the present century could be described as simple.' Two categories
* Lecturer, Faculty of Law, University of Dundee, Scotland, U.K.; LI.B., St. Andrews; Ll.M.,
London; Cert. in Social Antropology, Cambridge; Associate Member of the Institute of Linguists.
I See, eg., 2 D. O'CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 670-73 (2d ed. 1970); 1 L. OPPENHEIM,
INTERNATIONAL LAW 642-49 (Lauterpacht 8th ed. 1955); H.F. VAN PANHUYS, THE ROLE OF NA-
TIONALITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, AN OUTLINE (1959); P. WEIS, NATIONALITY AND STATE-
LESSNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, 3-62 (2d ed. 1980). For a U.K. view, see C. PARRY,
NATIONALITY AND CITIZENSHIP LAWS OF THE COMMONWEALTH AND THE REPUBLIC OF IRE-
LAND 3-27 (1957).
2 The best general discussion remains PARRY, supra note 1, at 28-91; see also M. JONES, BRIT-
ISH NATIONALITY LAW AND PRACTICE 28-73 (1947); M. JONES, BRITISH NATIONALITY LAW 51-
86 (1956). The leading cases on "protection" are: China Navigation Co. v. Attorney-General,
[1932] 2 K.B. 197 (C.A.); Mutasa v. Attorney-General, 1980 Q.B. 114. The leading cases on "alle-
giance" are: Joyce v. Director of Pub. Prosecutions, 1946 A.C. 347 (1945) (Lord Haw Haw's case),
which is fascinating but flawed; see, eg., Williams, The Correlation of Allegiance and Protection, 10
CAMBRIDGE L.J. 54 (1948). It is commonly assumed that English law, rather than Scots (or an
amalgam), was adopted when the two states ceased to exist upon their union into Great Britain in
1707, and that Irish law made no contribution when Great Britain merged with it in 1800 to form
the United Kingdom.
3 The locus classicus is the oft-quoted but obscurely reasoned and insufficiently analyzed Cal-
vin's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 377 (K.B. 1608).
4 There has been, of course, no such thing as "English nationality law" since 1707. See supra
note 2 and accompanying text.
5 Id.
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of persons existed: British subjects and aliens.' In essence, four methods
of becoming a British subject existed: mere birth in any part of the do-
minions of the Crown (thejus sol); descent in the male line from a sub-
ject (the jus sanguinis); naturalization; and by annexation of territory.
There was also a class of technically alien British protected persons
("BPP"), generally the population of protectorates.7 All British subjects
had a right of entry to the United Kingdom.'
1. The 1948 Scheme
The British Nationality Act of 1948' introduced important reforms.
First, there was a terminological change. The title British subject was
retained, but a new synonym was coined for it: Commonwealth citizen.'
Second, the decision as to who was a British subject/Commonwealth citi-
zen was in effect delegated to the independent Commonwealth countries
(including the United Kingdom)." The method of delegation was for-
mal acceptance of the proposal that each independent Commonwealth
country should create its own citizenship. It was agreed that the same
6 Thus, there was a "common status" held by Australians, Canadians, Jamaicans, Scotsmen,
etc., and those from Hong Kong. However, this was as much form as substance, since no rights
necessarily flowed from British subjecthood in any jurisdiction. In Australia, Canada, and South
Africa, racial categories operated to circumscribe civil liberties so that a British subject of Chinese
origin might well be treated worse than a European alien. See, e.g., R. HUTTENBACK, RACISM AND
EMPIRE: WHITE SETTLERS IN THE BRITISH SELF-GOVERNING COLONIES 1830-1910 (1976); see
also Musgrove v. Chun Teeong Toy, [1891] 16 A.C. 272 (P.C. 1890) (Victoria).
7 For discussion of this anomalous class, see PARRY, supra note 1, at 12-13, 89-91, 97, 147, 352.
It comprised very various groups. One of the first official uses of the term appears to be in relation to
the illegitimate offspring of British subject fathers and Chinese subject mothers. See 5 BRITISH DIG.
INT'L L. (compiled principally from the Archives of the Foreign Office) (C. Parry 1965) [hereinafter
BDIL]. More recently the class consisted of the inhabitants of protectorates and protected states,
none of which now have that status.
8 Director of Pub. Prosecutions v. Bhagwan, 1972 A.C. 60 (H.L. 1970). Curiously, it was only
after this right had been largely removed that the courts were induced to affirm its existence, see
infra note 17. The delay is perhaps best explained (as is the restriction) by the fact that only in the
1950's did British subjects commence to use the right in significant numbers.
9 British Nationality Act, 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, ch. 56. This Act came into force on January 1,
1949. Id. § 34(2).
10 Id. § 1(2)
11 Id. § 1(1)&(3). There were nine then (other than the United Kingdom itself): Canada,
Australia, New Zealand, Union of South Africa, Newfoundland, India, Pakistan, Southern Rhode-
sia, and Ceylon. Newfoundland merged with Canada shortly thereafter. Southern Rhodesia was not
technically independent, but was treated as such since it had been self-governing since 1923. Now
Southern Rhodesia is Zimbabwe, Ceylon is Sri Lanka, and Pakistan is split into Bangladesh (which
is in the Commonwealth) and Pakistan (which has left the Commonwealth, as has South Africa).
The provision in each country's nationality law bestowing British subject/Commonwealth citizen
status was referred to as the "common clause." This replaces "common status." See supra note 6.
However, Ceylon and South Africa declined to adopt the "common clause" provision as did Ireland
by virtue of its essentially republican constitution in 1936.
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methods of acquisition would be employed, mutatis mutandis.12 These
new citizenships were thus gateways to British subject-
hood/Commonwealth citizenship and all British subjects already in be-
ing were allotted to the appropriate "gateway citizenship."1 3 Inevitably a
few people fell between stools. For them an ad hoc status of British sub-
jects without citizenship ("BSWC") was created.14 BPP continued un-
changed.1 5 As to the dependent parts of the Commmonwealth, since
they were dependencies of the United Kingdom, they shared its "gate-
way citizenship," which was named Citizenship of the United Kingdom
and Colonies ("CUKC").16
Until 1962, all British subjects/Commonwealth citizens retained the
right to enter the United Kingdom. It was then restricted to those born
there or holding a U.K. Government issued (rather than colonial govern-
ment issued) passport.17 Thus, a class of CUKCs was created with no
right to enter the United Kingdom, although they had a right to enter a
colony.18
2. Decolonization
Decolonization fitted easily into the scheme.19 Each independence
12 See PARRY, supra note 1, at 93-4.
13 See 1948 British Nationality Act, §§ 12-14.
14 Id. § 13, sched. 3.
Is The most important group were Tamils in Sri Lanka. That country, as well as declining to
apply the "common clause," did not use the jus soil. See supra note 11. This was to ensure that
Tamils of Indian origin did not become Sri Lankan citizens. See PARRY, supra note 1, at 793-95.
Relations between Tamils and Sinhalese are notoriously even worse today. Since some of the Tamils
did not become Indian citizens either because of rules in the Indian citizenship law designed to cope
with the partition of the subcontinent into India and Pakistan, they became BSWCs. Originally it
was intended that BSWCs become CUKCs, but this was never effected since the United Kingdom
never recognized Indian or Pakistani citizenship laws. See PARRY, supra note 1, at 307 (Parry's
hopes were never fulfilled.). The BSWC category also contained, and contains, a substantial number
of people who became Irish citizens, but wished to retain a U.K. connection, and therefore were
given the right to acquire this status. Id. at 301-02, 306-07.
16 1948 British Nationality Act, §§ 1(1), 4-22.
17 Commonwealth Immigrants Act, 1962, 10 & 11 Eliz. 2, ch. 21 (especially § 1(3)). Ex parte
Bhurosah [1968] 1 Q.B. 266 (C.A.). The Act was designed to reduce "coloured immigration." Re-
striction of entry to CUKCs (the more obvious course) would have kept out those from India and
Pakistan, but not those from the West Indies (those being the two important sources of such immi-
gration), which were then still colonies. See, eg., J. M. EVANS, IMMIGRATION LAW 63-64 (2d ed.
1983); P. FOOT, IMMIGRATION AND RACE IN BRITISH POLITICS passim (1965).
I8 In fact, this right depended upon local colonial legislation and it would have been possible
for some CUKCs not to have such a right, since such legislation frequently required domicile as a
condition of entry. Thus, a child born in a colony of a CUKC father domiciled in an alien territory
with a passport issued by a colonial government would be at risk. See JUSTICE, BRITISH NATIONAL-
FrY: THE REPORT OF A WORKING PARTY app. C (1980).
19 At the time of the British Nationality Act of 1948, the United Kingdom had about 50 colo-
nies and protectorates. The great majority of these are now independent. Of the dozen inhabited
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act 2° stipulated that those acquiring citizenship of the new state thereby
lost CUKC status (unless they were expatriates born there, but had an
ancestral connection with the United Kingdom).21 The new citizenship
was added to the list of "gateway citizenships" in the 1948 Act.22
Variations did occur. Most important is that the East African coun-
tries provided that only those of African descent acquired citizenship
upon independence.21 Others, chiefly settlers from the Indian subconti-
nent, thus remained CUKCs.24  Since ex hypothesi no colonial govern-
ment remained, they held U.K. issued passports and thus retained the
right of entry to the United Kingdom under the 1962 legislation.25 They
might apply for the new citizenship after independence; 26 however, some
who attempted it found their applications lost, and others declined to try.
When further "Africanisation" rendered life intolerable in Kenya, these
"East African Asians" sought to enter the United Kingdom. 27 The Gov-
ernment immediately introduced legislation revoking their right.28 This
dependencies which remain, only Hong Kong could conceivably be independent. Pitcairn Island, for
instance, had a population of 61 in 1980. See BRITISH NATIONALITY LAW: OUTLINE OF PRO-
POSED LEGISLATION, 1980, CMND. No. 7987, app. C.
20 The normal pattern was for an act of parliament to grant independence. The Constitution of
the new country, including its nationality or citizenship law, was contained in an Order in Council
(i.e. a dignified form of delegated legislation made under powers given by the Act). See, eg., Zambia
Independence Act, 1964, 12 & 13 Eliz. 2, ch. 65; Zambia Independence Order, S.I. 1964, No. 1652.
21 E.g., Nigeria Independence Act, 1960, 8 & 9 Eliz. 2, ch. 60, §§ (2), 2(3)-(5). Section 2(2)
removes CUKCship and sections 2(3)-(5) make the exceptions.
22 Id. § 2(1). For "gateway citizenships," see supra note 11 and accompanying text.
23 Rule l(1) of the Kenya Independence Order provided that no person should become a citi-
zen of Kenya unless one or both parents were born in Kenya. Kenya Independence Order, S.I. 1963,
No. 1968. Cf Uganda Independence Order, S.I. 1962, No. 2175, rules 7,8.
24 See, e.g., STEEL, No ENTRY (1968).
25 See Commonwealth Immigrants Act, supra note 17.
26 E.g., Kenya Independence Order, supra note 23, rule 2(l).
27 See supra note 24.
28 See Commonwealth Immigrants Act, supra note 17. This Act mirrored the "expatriate
clauses" by requiring United Kingdom Passport Holders (UKPH), as they have become called, to
have an ancestral connection with the United Kingdom. Clearly few, if any, East African Asians
could fulfill this requirement. This episode was highly embarrassing for the U.K. Government
which was accused of breaches of the European Convention on Human Rights. See East African
Asians v. United Kingdom, 3 EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS REP. 76 (1981). The European Commis-
sion on Human Rights found the complaint admissible, but referred it to the Committee of Minis-
ters, not the European Court of Human Rights. Nevertheless, the Act was held to be racially
discriminatory, violating article 1 of the Convention (protecting against degrading treatment), and in
some cases article 8 (protection of family life) and article 14 (sexual discrimination). The U.K.
Government did introduce a "Special Voucher Scheme" to admit the UKPH, which still continues
and is subject to various criticisms. For discussion, see J. M. EVANS, IMMIGRATION LAW 120-22
(2d ed. 1985). A slightly more generous reception was given to those expelled from Uganda in 1972.
See HUMPHREY & WARD, PASSPORTS AND POLITICS (1974); R. MOORE & T. WALLACE, SLAM-
MING THE DOOR: THE ADMINISTRATION OF IMMIGRATION CONTROL (1975). See also HOME AF-
FAIRS COMMITTEE: NUMBERS AND LEGAL STATUS OF FUTURE BRITISH OVERSEAS CITIZENS
Vol. 20:225
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resulted in the creation of three classes of CUKCs: those with a right of
entry to the United Kingdom, those with a right to enter a colony, and
those with no right to enter anywhere.
3. The 1983 Scheme
The embarrassment of this position produced the British National-
ity Act of 1981.29 This retained the status of Commonwealth citizen,
3 °
but confusingly transferred the title British subject to those formerly
called British subjects without citizenship.31 It also replaced CUKC sta-
tus with three new "gateway citizenships," closely coinciding with the
three classes of CUKCs. 32 These are British citizenship ("BC"),33 Brit-
ish dependent territory citizenship ("BDTC"), 34 and British Overseas
citizenship ("BOC").35 It should be noted that over 90% of those hold-
ing BDTC were and are in Hong Kong.36
Methods of acquisition were changed too. Birth in the United King-
dom or a colony confers BC status or BDTC status, respectively, but
only if a parent, in the first case, is a BC or settled in the United King-
dom, and in the second case, is a BDTC or settled in a colony.37 BOC
status was ascribed at the coming into force of the 1981 Act and, subject
to minor exceptions, could not be acquired thereafter.38
Another new method was introduced as an amendment during the
passage of the bill through Parliament, after pressure from Hong Kong
Wrr OuT OTHER CITIZENSHIP, HousE OF COMMONS SECOND REPORT, 1980-81, H.C. Paper No.
158.
29 British Nationality Act, 1981, 29 & 30 Eliz. 2, ch. 61. The Act came into force on Jan. 1,
1983. British Nationality Act, 1981, (Commencement Order 1982), S.1. 1982, No. 933.
30 1981 British Nationality Act, § 37.
31 Id. pt. IV, §§ 30-35.
32 All are defined in terms of the means of acquisition, rather than contents or result, save that
section 39 amends the Immigration Act of 1971 to give British citizens the "right of abode" in the
United Kingdom. Id. pt. V, § 39; see infra note 39 and accompanying text. No collective name
exists for the three, possibly to avoid any admission that all have a presumptive right of entry. In
addition to the "gateway citizenships," there have grown up a number of ad hoc statuses, often
called "UK national," in various statutes referring to international obligations. E.g., Deep Sea Min-
ing (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1981, 29 & 30 Eliz. 2, ch. 53, § 1(4). (This includes not only the
three new citizenships, but also British subjects without citizenship and British protected persons).
The best known and most important such status-not in municipal law stricto sensu-is "UK na-
tional for [EEC] community purposes."
33 See 1981 British Nationality Act, pt. I, § 39.
34 Id. pt. II. The dependencies are defined by reference to a list in schedule 6.
35 Id. pt. II.
36 See supra note 19 (which provides the figures from which these calculations were made).
37 1981 British Nationality Act, §§ 1(1), 15(1). Variations upon it exist (e.g. a right to register
if parents become citizens or settled before the child's majority). Id. §§ 1(3), 15(3).
38 Id. § 26 (section 27 allows registration of minors; section 28 allows registration of spouses).
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before negotiations with China had opened.39 It allows a person to be
registered as a BC (and thus acquire a right of entry to the United King-
dom) if the Secretary of State "thinks fit in the special circumstances of
the ... case ... [and the person has been] in Crown service under the
government of a [colony] ... [or] a member of any body established by
law in a [colony], the members of which are appointed by . .. the
Crown."'
4. What is the "Real" Nationality?
Suffice it to say that so far as the United Kingdom and its colonies
are concerned, Commonwealth citizenship has remained the "real" sta-
tus for municipal purposes,41 except with respect to immigration. Thus,
Commonwealth citizenship governs the franchise, entry to government
service, etc. This "gateway" status is nationality for international pur-
poses.42 However, clearly the present form of the law derives largely
from the desire to restrict entry.43
B. Chinese Nationality Law
Chinese nationality law was recently recast, albeit without major
change of principle." Acquisition of nationality is essentially jure
39 See debate in Standing Committee on 1981 British Nationality Act: OFFICIAL REPORT,
HOUSE OF COMMONS, Standing Committee F, Mar. 31, 1981, pts. 1, 2, cols. 903-914 (23rd Sitting).
40 1981 British Nationality Act, § 4(5), (6). The significance of the drafting lies in the assump-
tion that civil servants (etc.) feared reprisals after 1997. A very high proportion of the population
are civil servants, since "local government" functions are carried out by the central government. See
supra note 39, cols. 904, 906-7.
41 The franchise is bestowed, for example, upon all resident Commonwealth citizens. See Rep-
resentation of the People Act, 1949, 12 & 13 Geo. 6, ch. 68, §§ 1(1), 2(1) (as amended).
42 Authority is lacking largely because diplomatic and consular protection cannot be sued for.
See cases cited supra note 2. However, Mutasa (the post-1948 British Nationality Act case) was a
first instance decision in which the Crown conceded a duty to British subjects/Commonwealth citi-
zens resident in Southern Rhodesia (as it then was), it being part of the dominions of the Crown,
albeit in rebellion at the time. Thus, the central issue was avoided. Nevertheless, on general princi-
ple, while the Crown may have a political or moral duty to protect "subjects" (i.e., now Common-
wealth citizens), the Crown in right of HM Government of the United Kingdom can only be
responsible for those connected with the United Kingdom, while the Crown in right of, say, Canada,
is responsible for those connected with Canada. Equally, a British citizen would expect U.K. Gov-
ernment assistance in a dispute with Canadian authorities and vice versa. This conclusion is sup-
ported by S. DE SMITH, CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 148-49 (5th ed. 1985) (note,
however, that the reference at page 441 is difficult to reconcile).
43 It is paradoxically but clearly the case that there is no such thing as a "British national" or
"U.K. national" in municipal law. Contra supra note 32 (exceptions).
44 The Nationality Law of the People's Republic of China [hereinafter NLPRC] (adopted by
the Fifth National People's Congress on July 10, 1980). No official translation was distributed. See
Official Report, House of Lords, vol. 460, col. 508. Photocopies of an unofficial translation are
available. See news release from New China News Agency (Sept. 14, 1980; Beijing). The new law is
discussed at length by Ginsburgs who notes that the previous law was very uncertain (being the 1929
Vol. 20:225
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sanguinis only.45
The principal provision is that "any person born in China whose
parents are Chinese nationals or one of whose parents is a Chinese na-
tional has Chinese nationality."46 Also, "any person born abroad whose
parents are Chinese nationals or one of whose parents is a Chinese na-
tional has Chinese nationality," provided they have not settled abroad
and the child has not acquired a foreign nationality upon birth. 7
Aliens and stateless people may become naturalized if they are
"willing to abide by China's constitution" provided they have close rela-
tives in China, are settled there, or have "other legitimate reasons."48
The children born in China of people who are stateless or of uncertain
nationality settled in China are Chinese nationals.4 9
Dual nationality is not allowed, thus voluntary naturalization
abroad removes Chinese nationality ° and a person naturalized in China
is "[not] permitted to retain foreign nationality."'"
C. International Law on Nationality
Broadly, customary international law leaves the settlement of ques-
tions of nationality to municipal law. 2 None of the cases (such as the
famous Nottebohm 3 decision) throws much light on the Hong Kong
question. The various conventions on nationality law have no particular
application to the situation, with the exception of the Hague Convention
on Certain Questions Relating to Conflicts of Nationality Law (1930).
This Convention recognizes the autonomy of municipal systems, but de-
clares the following precepts: 1) that a dual national may not be repre-
sented by one of his or her states against the other,54 and 2) that a third
state confronted with competing assertions of nationality should apply
legislation of the Nationalist Government which was formally rejected by the Communist Govern-
ment). See Ginsburgs, The 1980 Nationality Law of the People's Republic of China, 30 AM. J. COMP.
L. 459 (1982). Ginsburgs does not consider the law in relation to Hong Kong.
45 Article 2 of the NLPRC does describe the P.R.C. as a "unified, multi-national country" and
asserts that "persons belonging to any of the nationalities of China have Chinese nationality."
NLPRC, supra note 44. This is obscure and may be a political rather than legal statement. For
discussion, see Ginsburgs, supra note 44, at 460-61.
46 NLPRC, supra note 44, art. 4.
47 Id. art. 5.
48 Id. art. 7. Those living in Hong Kong are not regarded as being abroad, since China claims
sovereignty over the territory, see infra notes 60, 63, 107 and accompanying text.
49 NLPRC, supra note 44, art. 6.
50 Id. art. 9.
51 Id. art. 8.
52 See 2 D. O'CONNELL, supra note 1, ch. 21, at 678-81. See also, Convention on Conflict of
Nationality Laws, Apr. 12, 1930, arts. 1-2, 179 L.N.T.S. 89.
53 Nottebohm (Liechtenstein v. Guatemala), 1955 I.C.J. 5; Flegenheimer, 25 I.L.R. 91 (Italian-
U.S. Conciliation Comm'n 1958); Merg&, 22 I.L.R. 443 (Italian-U.S. Conciliation Comm'n 1955).
54 Convention on Conflict of Nationality Laws, supra note 52, art. 4.
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either the test of "habitual and principal residence" or "most close
connection." 5-
II. HONG KONG, ITS PEOPLE, NATIONALITY AND IMMIGRATION
A. U.K. Acquisition of the Land56
Hong Kong Island was acquired by the Treaty of Nanking of
1842,17 while a thin strip of the mainland and the adjacent Stonecutters
Island were acquired by the Treaty of Peking of 1860.58 Both treaties are
regarded by the United Kingdom as cessions. It has recently been sug-
gested that the imperial Chinese government did not so regard them. 9
In any case, both have been regarded by subsequent Chinese govern-
ments as "unequal treaties," thus void or voidable.60
The great majority of the land, still known as the "New Territories,"
was acquired by the (second) Convention of Peking of 1898,6" through
what was described as a "lease" for ninety-nine years (thus, the signifi-
cance of July 1, 1997). However, whatever the contemporary Chinese
view, the United Kingdom considered (and continued to consider) it as
tantamount to cession.2 Chinese governments have regarded it as
55 Id. art. 5.
56 Acquisition occurred as part of the "Opium Wars" (in which European and American
traders sought to compel the Chinese Empire to trade, particularly in opium) and resulting relations.
For a general account of the period, see 10 D. TWITCHETT & J. FAIRBANK, THE CAMBRIDGE
HISTORY OF CHINA (LATE CH'ING, 1800-1911) (1978); 11 D. TwITCHETT & J. FAIRBANK, THE
CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF CHINA (LATE CH'ING, 1800-1911) (1980). For a recent and fascinating
fictionalized account, see T. Mo, AN INSULAR POSSESSION (1986).
57 Treaty of Nanking, Aug. 29, 1842, Great Britain-China, 30 British & Foreign State Papers
(Gr. Brit.) 389, reprinted in HERTSLET'S CHINA TREATIES 7-12 (3d ed. 1908) [hereinafter HCT]; 5
BDIL, supra note 7, at 148 (relevant portions are quoted therein). This treaty was chiefly concerned
with setting up the "Treaty ports," exacting war reparations, and ensuring free trade.
58 Convention of Friendship, Oct. 24, 1860, Great Britain-China, 30 British and Foreign State
Papers (Gr. Brit.) 10-12; HCT, supra note 57, at 48-50; relevant portions are quoted in 5 BDIL,
supra note 7, at 110-12. It is also chiefly concerned with reparations and with amendment of the
Treaty of Shanghai of 1858.
59 Dicks, Treaty, Grant, Usage or Sufferance? Some Legal Aspects of the Status of Hong Kong,
95 CHINA QUARTERLY 427, 445-46 (1983).
60 Id. at 434-35. By virtue of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969), interna-
tional law recognizes that a treaty may be void if procured by force or threat when it is contrary to
the principles of the United Nations Charter (arts. 53, 64, 71); this, however, is not retrospective.
See 1 D. O'CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 244 (2d. ed. 1970).
61 Convention for the Extension of Hong Kong Territory, June 9, 1898, Great Britain-China, 1
HCT 130-31. The reasons for the extension are discussed in WESLEY-SMrrH, UNEQUAL TREATIES
1898-1997: CHINA, GREAT BRITAIN, AND HONG KONG's NEw TERRITORIES 29-44 (1980).
62 The New Territories Order in Council (Oct. 20, 1898) roundly declared the New Territories
to be "part and parcel of HM Colony of Hong Kong in like manner and for all intents and purposes
as if they had originally formed part of said colony." In 1911, the Governor of Hong Kong, specifi-
cally in relation to nationality, asserted "... it is, I presume, inconceivable that the [New Territories]
will ever revert to China." 5 BDIL, supra note 7, at 404.
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"unequal."6 3
International law recognizes cession as a means of transfer of terri-
tory." "Leases" have been too rare for any jurisprudence to arise.65 The
doctrine of "unequal treaties" is not accepted as such.66
B. U.K. Acquisition of the People
The 1942 Treaty of Nanking and the 1860 Treaty of Peking did not
mention their effect on nationality. Under U.K. municipal law, cession
bestows nationality without necessarily assuming the old nationality to
be lost.67 Thus, while regarding the inhabitants of Hong Kong as British
subjects, it did not deny Chinese claims that the ceded population re-
mained Chinese. International law accepts this, but the Hague Conven-
tion principles, applied retrospectively, would favor British subjecthood
in the event of a conflict.68
The third treaty, the 1898 Convention of Peking, did not mention
nationality either, and U.K. municipal law does not explicitly deal with
the effect of such a "lease" on nationality. Nevertheless, from early days
the population was assumed to have become British subjects. 69 It is in-
63 Wesley-Smith doubts if the 1898 treaty can be regarded as unequal. See WESLEY-SMITH,
supra note 61, at 184-185. Dicks is equivocal. See Dicks, supra note 59, at 434, 451-53.
64 1 D. O'CONNELL, supra note 1, at 431-34.
65 O'Connell records a lease in 1888 of Zanzibari territory to the British East Africa Company.
Id. at 329. Part of this was assigned to Italy, then "sold" outright. The rest was taken over in 1895
by the U.K. Government and ultimately passed to Kenya. Dicks refers to a lease of territory "south
of the Namwan River" under the Agreement of Feb. 4, 1897, modifying the Burma Frontier and
Trade Convention of March 1, 1894. Dicks, supra note 59, at 448 n.80 (quoting TREATIES, CON-
VENTIONS, ETC. BETWEEN CHINA AND FOREIGN STATES: CHINA, THE MARITIME CUSTOMS, III-
MISC. SERIES, No. 30 (2d ed. 1917)). This was regarded as Chinese territory but the Agreement
declared thit China "shall not exercise any jurisdiction or authority whatever" and that the U.K.
Government "will hold it on a perpetual lease from China, paying rent for it. . ." (fixed at 1,000
rupees per annum). Id.
66 But see Vienna Convention, supra note 60.
67 PARRY, supra note 1, at 73-74. It was seriously contended as late as 1824 (in an English
case), that the inhabitants of the Thirteen Colonies still retained British subjecthood (and the War of
1812 depended partly upon that conclusion). Doe d. Thomas v. Acklam, 107 Eng. Rep. 572 (1824).
Parry also refers to Stewart v. Hoome, XI-XII Mo. Dic. 4649 (1792) (erroneously cited as 6 Mo.
Dic. 4649), an earlier Scottish case of first instance so holding, and Shedden v. Patrick, 1 Macq. 535
(1854) (erroneously cited as 1 Macy 525), a later Scottish case on appeal to the House of Lords who
admitted U.S. alienage. Id. at 73 n.18.
68 See supra note 52.
69 In fact, in the Foreign Office (as opposed to the Colonial Office) considerable doubt existed
immediately after the lease and there is a respectable argument that in U.K. law, the New Territories
population were not acquired. This is discussed at length in White, Hong Kong, Nationality and the
British Empire: Historic Doubts and Confusions on the Status of the Inhabitants, 17 HONG KONG
L.J. (forthcoming). In brief, the argument is that a lease does not transmit sovereignty. Thus, the
inhabitants did not become British subjects at the time (and nothing in later legislation mended the
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L LV
teresting that the possibility of their becoming British protected persons70
was tacitly rejected.
Given that the agreement was a "lease," Chinese claims to national-
ity can hardly be denied. Given the rarity of "leases," a fortiori interna-
tional law is unhelpful, but again the Hague Convention principles would
favor British subjecthood.71
C. The Present Population of Hong Kong
The population of Hong Kong is 5.5 million.7 2 Two percent are not
of Chinese origin.73 These ethnic minorities among the permanent popu-
lation include about 6,000 people of ultimately Indian subcontinent ori-
gin, 2,000 of European origin, and small numbers of "Eurasians,"
Malaysians, and Indo-Chinese.74 All of them or their ancestors arrived
during U.K. rule. There are also several thousands of Vietnamese "boat
people" awaiting resettlement.75
Of the 98% of Chinese origin, an extraordinary 40% are recent im-
migrants from China.76 Many left China, and entered Hong Kong, ille-
defect in title). So if they became British subjects the Territories must, at some time, have been
annexed unilaterally (which is not admitted by the U.K. Government).
70 See supra note 7.
71 See supra note 52.
72 HONG KONG 1986 (Hong Kong Government Annual Report). The population declined
from 850,000 in 1931 to 600,000 in 1946, largely as a result of the Japanese occupation (Hong Kong
was attacked on the same day as Pearl Harbor). It rose to 1,800,000 by 1947, over 3,000,000 by 1961
and 4,000,000 in 1971, as much by immigration from China as by natural increase. Many entrants
in the early 1960s were refugees from the Cultural Revolution, and many in the late 1970s benefited
from liberalization of the regime. See infra note 76.
73 HONG KONG 1986, supra note 72.
74 JOINT COUNCIL FOR THE WELFARE OF IMMIGRANTS, A QUESTION OF BELONGING: BRIT-
ISH NATIONALITY LAW AND THE FUTURE OF HONG KONG (1985). Somewhat higher figures,
based on the 1981 Census, are given in an official pamphlet. HONG KONG GOVERNMENT INFORMA-
TION SERVICES, HONG KONG: THE FACTS: POPULATION (1986).
75 In mid-1986 there were 11,000. This figure fluctuates since a small number resettle annu-
ally, yet unpredictable numbers of people often arrive. For a general discussion, see HOME AFFAIRS
COMMITTEE: REFUGEES AND ASYLUM WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE VIETNAMESE, HOUSE
OF COMMONS THIRD REPORT, 1984-85, H.C. Paper No. 72; HOME OFFICE GOVERNMENT REPLY
TO THE THIRD REPORT, 1985, CMND. No. 9629.
76 HONG KONG GOVERNMENT INFORMATION SERVICES, HONG KONG: THE FACTS: IMMI-
GRATION (1986). See also, Clarke, Hong Kong Immigration Control: The Law and the Bureaucratic
Maze, 16 HONG KONG L.J. 342, 343 (1987). This massive immigration is one of the most interesting
features in the study of Hong Kong nationality and immigration. See supra note 72. Their work has
been a foundation for the colony's wealth, although many were refugees. The implications for the
nationality aspects of the Settlement are considerable, since there is a large non-national, but settled
and welcome, population who left China for economic, political, and other reasons. (The border is
arbitrary in terms of family lineages). Clarke records that 27,000 are still admitted for settlement
annually despite recent restrictions. Clarke, supra note 76, at 361. It is reported that in mid-1987,
considerable pressure is building up in China to enter Hong Kong for economic reasons. See, eg.,
The Times (London), June 27, 1987.
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gaily. Until 1980, the "reach base" policy was used; that is, illegal
entrants reaching an urban area were given permission to stay.77
1. The Present Population and Chinese Nationality
Since Chinese nationality operates essentially jure sanguinis, all
those of Chinese origin are Chinese nationals. 78 Those becoming natural-
ized as BDTCs might be an exception under the rule against dual nation-
ality,79 but China might decline to accept the validity of such acts. Since
Hong Kong is not "abroad," the Chinese nationality law provisions relat-
ing to settlement abroad do not apply.
2. The Present Population and U.K. Nationality Law
Since the orthodox U.K. view is that the whole of Hong Kong is
part of the dominions of the Crown,80 those born there are BDTCs by
virtue of such birth"1 (save those born since the British Nationality Act
of 1981 who require a BDTC or a settled parent),82 irrespective of ethnic
origin. Naturalized immigrants83 and the progeny of either group born
abroad are also BDTCs.84 It is estimated that there are 3.25 million
BDTCs in Hong Kong: 3.19 million by birth, 53,000 by naturalization,
and a few by descent.8"
77 See Clarke, supra note 76, at 361.
78 See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text; but see supra notes 48-49 and accompanying
text.
79 See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
80 But ef supra note 69.
81 In the case of those born before Jan. 1, 1949 (commencement of the 1948 British Nationality
Act), they were born British subjects, remained so thereafter (subject to the alternative title Com-
monwealth citizen), but were allotted to CUKC status. See supra notes 9, 10, 16 and accompanying
text. Having lost the right of entry to the United Kingdom in 1962, they were allotted to BDTC
status under 1981 British Nationality Act. See supra notes 17, 29, 34 and accompanying text. In the
case of those born from 1949 through 1982, they are in the same position as those born earlier,
mutatis mutandis.
82 1981 British Nationality Act, pt. II, § 15(1). The change is important to the descendants of
those illegally entering since the end of the "reach base" policy in 1980, and to those of Vietnamese
refugees, since neither will now automatically acquire a U.K. nationality at birth. See supra note 77
and accompanying text.
83 The cases of those naturalized either before 1949 or between 1949 and 1982 inclusive (the
latter naturalized under the 1948 British Nationality Act or registered under §§ 6-9) parallel the
cases of those born in Hong Kong in the same time periods. See supra note 81.
84 1948 British Nationality Act, § 16; 1981 British Nationality Act, § 16 (not all descendants
beyond the first generation are citizens). The 1981 British Nationality Act provisions are compli-
cated, but allow inheritance of nationality from either parent.
85 HONG KONG: THE NATIONALITY PROVISIONS OF THE HONG KONG ACT 1985: A DRAFT
ORDER IN COUNCIL, 1986, CMND. No. 9637, para. 10. The actual Order in Council was issued as a
statutory instrument. See infra note 152.
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3. The Present Population and Hong Kong Immigration Status
Hong Kong immigration law is complicated.86 Effectively, however,
by virtue of a Hong Kong connection (whether Chinese or from ethnic
minorities) BDTCs are "Hong Kong belongers."8 7 They have a right to
land (i.e. to enter Hong Kong), and cannot be deported or otherwise
removed."8 This group constitutes about 60% of the population. 9
There are also a few "resident British Citizens" with similar rights.9°
The 40% of the population who are neither Hong Kong belongers
nor resident British citizens have various statuses. Those who are
"wholly or partly of Chinese race" and who have "at any time been resi-
dent in Hong Kong for a continuous period of not less than seven years"
are "Chinese residents."91 They have a right to land, but may be de-
ported on certain grounds.92 Non-Chinese have no equivalent status, but
those with nine years residence are normally granted indefinite leave to
remain.93 Almost all the rest are Chinese who have not met the seven
year residence requirement. They, and non-Chinese without nine years
residence, have no right to land, but are admitted subject to various
conditions.94
III. THE HONG KONG SETTLEMENT95
The reasons for the settlement throw light on the nature of the na-
86 See Hong Kong Immigration Ordinance, ch. 115 (1984) [hereinafter HKIO]. For a compre-
hensive discussion, see Clarke, supra note 76.
87 HKIO, § 2(1), sched. 1 ("Hong Kong belonger").
88 Id. §§ 7, 8; id. pt. V.
89 Coinciding very closely, of course, with the BDTC population.
90 HKIO, § 2(1) ("resident British citizen").
91 Id. ("Chinese resident").
92 Id. §§ 7, 8; id. pt. V.
93 Clarke, supra note 76, at 359.
94 HKIO, §§ 7, 11, 13. British citizens not "resident" are readily admitted. Clarke, supra note
76, at 358-59. The Vietnamese refugees enter under special provisions as they are admitted for
resettlement elsewhere; they are, thus, not "ordinarily resident" so cannot become "residents" or
"belongers" (except for a few resettled in Hong Kong itself). See HKIO, pt. III(A). All those
entering since August 1982 are detained in "closed camps." Immigration (Vietnamese Refugee Cen-
tres) (Closed Camps) (Designation) Order 1982 (made under HKIO § 13C(1)). This does not affect
their status.
95 The settlement is delineated in a White Paper (released in both Chinese and English)
entitled: A Draft Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland and the Government of the People's Republic of China on the Future of Hong
Kong [hereinafter Draft Agreement], Cmnd. 9352, Misc. No. 20 (1984), reprinted in 23 I.L.M. 1366
(1984). The Draft Agreement contains 1) an Introduction, 2) a Joint Declaration of the Government
of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the People's
Republic of China on the Question of Hong Kong [hereinafter Joint Declaration], 3) an Exchange of
Memoranda on nationality [hereinafter Exchange], and 4) Explanatory Notes. The Joint
Declaration contains three Annexes, the first being a lengthy Elaboration by the Government of the
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tionality provisions. For China there were perhaps two imperatives: re-
integration of the territory and people (thus overcoming a national
humiliation), 96 and maintenance of Hong Kong as a wealthy economic
enterprise and window on the world.97 These imperatives can clearly
conflict. Undoubtedly, a further factor was the precedent to be created
for future reintegration of Taiwan.
For the United Kingdom, the imperative was the need to maintain
business confidence and, thus, the very viability of the colony with the
onset of 1997. Further, a population of BDTCs and aliens under U.K.
protection requires reassurance as to their future, not the least on pru-
dential grounds. The United Kingdom had no desire to become respon-
sible for 5.5 million disaffected people half a world away. There is also
an ambivalence towards the Commonwealth, including a desire to reduce
post-imperial obligations (the Falklands affair notwithstanding).98 It is
also significant that Hong Kong has about fifty times the population of
all other dependencies combined. 99
People's Republic of China of its Basic Policies regarding Hong Kong [hereinafter Annex I]. Joint
Declaration of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and
the Government of People's Republic of China on the Question of Hong Kong, Dec. 19, 1984,
United Kingdom-People's Republic of China, 1984 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 20 (Cmnd. 9352), reprinted in
draft form in 23 I.L.M. 1371 (1984). The Joint Declaration alone was finally published (in English
and Chinese) as Joint Declaration of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland and the Government of People's Republic of China on the Question of Hong
Kong. 1985 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 26 (Cmnd. 9543). The Introduction and the Explanatory Notes were
both drafted by the U.K. Government. The latter is sometimes a useful interpretive device, but it
should be remembered that it is a document drafted by one signatory interpreting ex parte the
intentions of the other.
96 This is notorious and clear from the wording of the Joint Declaration. See Joint Declara-
tion, supra note 95. Paragraph (3)(1) declares the first of the "basic policies" to be "upholding
national unity and territorial integrity." Id. para. 3(1).
97 This is also clear from the opening recital of the Joint Declaration which refers to a negoti-
ated settlement as being "conducive to the maintenance of the prosperity and stability of Hong
Kong." Id. preamble. Howe asserts that China enjoys a large trade surplus with Hong Kong, that it
earns foreign exchange through Hong Kong's free port, and that Hong Kong is a center for trade
contacts, financial negotiations and obtaining commercial intelligence. See HONG KONG: IN
SEARCH OF A FUTURE (Cheng ed. 1984) (quoting Howe, Growth, Policy and Hong Kong's Economic
Relations with China, 95 CHINA Q. 512-33, 530).
98 From a nationality point of view the Falklands affair was interesting. Under the 1948 Brit-
ish Nationality Act, those born in the Falklands were CUKCs (the Falklands being a colony) and
thus were British subjects/Commonwealth citizens. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. As
with other colonial populations, such CUKCs lost the right of entry to the U.K. in 1962 and became
BDTCs under the 1981 British Nationality Act. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. How-
ever, in the wake of the armed conflict, a Private Member's Bill was introduced, which the Govern-
ment allowed to pass, rendering BDTCs by virtue of their connection with the Falkland Islands
British citizens. This was clearly symbolic in that the U.K. sought to recover the Islands after the
Argentine invasion without requiring the population to be British citizens, and in that all but 400 of
them were British citizens under the Act already. See The Times (London) Nov. 30, 1982.
99 This inference is drawn from figures quoted in BRITISH NATIONALITY LAW"v OUTLINE OF
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Thus, a convergence of the interests of the two states-U.K. and
P.R.C.-occurred at a time when a doctrinaire Chinese leadership had
given way to a pragmatic one.10" This nevertheless underlines that the
decolonization of Hong Kong is not a process whereby government is
handed over to local people colorably representative of their population.
IV. THE NATIONALITY PROVISIONS OF THE
HONG KONG SETrLEMENT
The Joint Declaration itself does not refer directly to nationality.
The first numbered paragraph does declare that the Chinese Government
"has decided to resume the exercise of sovereignty over Hong Kong," 101
and the third numbered paragraph (reciting the Chinese Government's
"basic policies") refers to "[u]pholding national unity and territorial in-
tegrity." 102 The same paragraph, however, also refers to "taking account
of the history of Hong Kong and its realities."10 3 It also provides that
the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region ("HKSAR") "may on its
own issue travel documents for entry into and exit from Hong Kong."
A. The Chinese Position on Nationality
The Joint Declaration does cross-refer to nationality in the first of
its three Annexes.105 The first Annex, an "Elaboration by the Govern-
ment of the People's Republic of China of its Basic Policies Regarding
Hong Kong" ("Elaboration"), refers to the "right of abode" in the
newly created HKSAR.106 But again, the document does not expressly
mention nationality. Specific mention is made in the Chinese Memoran-
dum in an Exchange of Memoranda appended to the Joint Declaration
PROPOSED LEGISLATION, supra note 19. Since 40% of Hong Kong's population are not BDTCs, the
proportion of BDTCs who are Hong Kong residents is different; nevertheless about 97% of all
BDTCs are in Hong Kong. The significance is obvious; without Hong Kong there is no point in the
category of BDTC existing.
100 An immediate catalyst for the merger of U.K. and P.R.C. interests was business confidence,
or lack thereof. The U.K. Government's Introduction to the Draft Agreement in paragraph 5 refers
to the fact of leases (i.e. commercial leases granted by the Hong Kong Government) expiring three
days before July 1, 1997, and that "[i]t was clear that the steadily shortening span of these leases, and
the inability of the Hong Kong Government to grant new ones extending beyond 1997 would be
likely to deter investment and damage confidence." See supra note 95. This was thought likely to be
a problem from the mid-1980s. Id. paras. 6, 7.
101 Joint Declaration, supra note 95, para. 3(1).
102 Id.
103 Id. para. 3(5).
104 Id. para. 3(10). This policy was reiterated in the Chinese Memorandum on nationality.
There was clearly no need for an equivalent statement in the U.K. Memorandum. Exchange, U.K.
Memorandum, supra note 95.
105 Joint Declaration, supra note 95, Annex I.
106 Id. Annex I, § XIV.
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and Annexes."' The Chinese Memorandum asserts that "[u]nder the
Nationality Law of the People's Republic of China, all Hong Kong Chi-
nese compatriots, whether they are holders of the 'British Dependent
Territories citizens' Passport' or not, are Chinese nationals."10
The general meaning of this statement is clear, and very much what
one might expect. The phrase "Chinese compatriots," however, is puz-
zling. Although the surrounding text strongly implies that it is a term of
art in Chinese nationality law, the only available translation of the
P.R.C. Nationality Law does not use it.109 No explanation is given in the
Memorandum itself, but it is apt to exclude the ethnic minorities, as the
nationality law's use of thejus sanguinis implies.'t 0
B. The Chinese Position on Freedom to Travel and Return
Section XIII of the Elaboration merely reaffirms the existing Hong
Kong freedom "of travel" without explanation. 1 ' Section XIV, how-
ever, stipulates who shall have the right of abode in Hong Kong and
asserts a freedom to leave for the holders of certain travel documents,
makes provision for the issue of travel documents, and grants to the
HKSAR Government power over immigration control.' 2
1. Right of Abode
"Right of abode" is a term of art in U.K. immigration law1 3 and
107 Exchange, supra note 95. The Exchange is exclusively concerned with nationality. One
may infer that the device is a means by which each side might make assertions on the matter without
the other feeling obliged to react to them.
108 Exchange, Chinese Memorandum, supra note 95. The reference to BDTC passports is un-
necessary insofar as the fact that. U.K. municipal law ascribes one nationality is no barrier to Chinese
municipal law ascribing another. Its function, no doubt, is to allow the Chinese Government to put
on record its conclusion that since the U.K. never properly exercised sovereignty over Hong Kong, it
could not (or should not) have ascribed a nationality to the population. The reference to passports
as such must be read with a further reference in the Memorandum to immigration. See Immigration
Act of 1971, infra note 113.
109 NLPRC, supra note 44.
110 NLPRC, supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text; but see notes 48-49 and accompanying
text. The Explanatory Notes seem to suggest this. See Explanatory Notes, supra note 95, para. 65.
However, it is possible that it is a matter of poor translation, or a stylistic device to avoid saying "all
Hong Kong Chinese nationals...are Chinese nationals" (ef. similar tautology in art. 2 of NLPRC) or
to avoid writing out the Chinese nationality law in extenso, given a tradition that sets no great store
by tight drafting. NLPRC, supra note 45, art. 2. It might also be a device to exclude political
undesirables (given the overtones of "comrade").
111 Joint Declaration, supra note 95, Annex I, § XIII. It also refers to a right "of movement."
Possibly, this means a right of internal movement although this is unlikely given the tiny size of
Hong Kong.
112 Id. Annex I, § XIV.
113 See Immigration Act of 1971, § 1(1) (effectively a codifying statute). The term "right of
abode" means the freedom "to live in, and to come and go into and from, the United Kingdom
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could be helpful in this context.' 14 But it is not in Hong Kong immigra-
tion law." 5 Also, it appears in an ex parte document of the Chinese
Government.
In later paragraphs, however, section XIV refers to HKSAR travel
documents as being universally valid, recording the holder's ability to
return, and permitting the holders of valid travel documents to leave
without special authorization "[u]nless restrained by law.""' 6 These
paragraphs may give some meaning to the term right of abode, and one
consonant with the phrase in U.K. law."'
In contrast, the categories of people entitled to identity cards stipu-
lating their right of abode are defined with some exactitude. Essentially,
these categories are:
1) all Chinese nationals born in Hong Kong at any time, and their
children wherever born;
2) all Chinese nationals with seven years of continuous
"ordinar[ ]y" residence in Hong Kong at any time, and their children
wherever born;
3) all non-Chinese nationals with seven years of continuous
"ordinar[ ]y" residence in Hong Kong at any time and who "have taken
Hong Kong as their place of permanent residence," and their children
under 21 years of age;
4) any person who had "the right of abode only in Hong Kong"
without let or hindrance except such as may be required under and in accordance with this Act to
enable the right to be established or as may be otherwise lawfully imposed on any person." Id.
There is also an inconsistent usage of the same phrase in European Community Law, but this can be
ignored.
114 It would also be echoed in part by various other statements in section XIV, such as the
reference to those who have a "right of abode only in Hong Kong" and the penultimate paragraph
which reads: "[u]nless restrained by law, holders of all travel documents shall be free to leave the
Hong Kong Administrative Region [HKSAR] without special authorisation." Joint Declaration,
supra note 95, Annex I, § XIV. At paragraph 49, the Explanatory Notes refer to "the right of abode
(including the right to enter, re-enter, live and work)" and, at paragraph 51, assert that the Elabora-
tion "makes clear that the right to leave the Hong Kong SAR for any purpose, e.g. business, study or
emigration, will be maintained subject to the normal exceptions under the law." See Explanatory
Notes, supra note 95, paras. 49, 51. The Explanatory Notes also assert "that the rights and freedoms
previously enjoyed under the laws of Hong Kong will be maintained," and "that the provisions of
the International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights . . . as they apply to Hong Kong, will
continue to apply .... " Id. para. 43.
115 Indeed it contains no generalization of that nature, merely a reference to the "right to
land."
116 Joint Declaration, supra note 95, Annex I, § XIV (second, third & sixth unnumbered
paragraphs).
117 Thus, while there is no reason to assume identity with the "right of abode" in U.K. law,
taken 'at face value, it could amount to the same thing, subject to the reference to "travel
documents."
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before July 1, 1997.118
One significant feature of these categories is that not all Chinese na-
tionals acquire a right of abode in Hong Kong; 19 another is the limited
importance accorded to Chinese resumption of sovereignty on July 1,
1997.120 Also, it seems that seven years of continuous residence does not
have to be accrued in adulthood and, once accrued, is not lost by resi-
dence elsewhere. 1 ' On the other hand, this list contains some imponder-
ables. Although right of abode has no technical meaning here, the
reference to it presumably must refer to "Hong Kong belonger" sta-
tus.'22 Furthermore, determining those with no equivalent status else-
where for the purposes of the fourth category poses an empirical
question. 123
Nevertheless, the right of abode is clearly distributed widely.
Nearly all Hong Kong belongers are Chinese nationals and fall into the
first category, while the Chinese residents of Hong Kong fall into the
second. Ethnic minorities will normally fall into the third; the fourth is a
useful catch-all.
Precisely who is affected depends upon the complex interaction of
Chinese nationality law, the Hong Kong Immigration Ordinance, and
U.K. nationality law and these complexities will not be pursued here.
However, it appears that the only likely groups who are already "Hong
Kong belongers" and fail to acquire the right of abode are 1) those ex-
Chinese nationals who have acquired a foreign nationality (thereby
forfeiting Chinese nationality), and 2) those ethnic minority members
who either do not have seven years continuous residence in Hong Kong
or do not have Hong Kong as their permanent residence.12 4 It is possible
118 Joint Declaration, supra note 95, Annex I, § XIV. The Explanatory Notes assert, accu-
rately, that the provision "provides for a high degree of continuity" as between "belonger" status
and the "right of abode." See Explanatory Notes, supra note 95, para. 48.
119 Indeed, later in section XIV it is clearly stated that other Chinese nationals "shall continue
to be regulated in accordance with the present practice." Joint Declaration, supra note 95, Annex I,
§ XIV.
120 The right is given to nationals born in Hong Kong either before or after this date (category
1), and to those achieving seven years of residence either before or after it (categories 2 and 3). Id.
121 This is important given the number of residents seeking to move abroad. If this inference is
wrong, they might ultimately be treated as non-Chinese nationals (under NLPRC art. 9) with per-
manent residence abroad, thus ineligible under category 3. For further discussion, see infra note
124.
122 HKIO, § 2(1), sched. 1.
123 Also, while "ordinary residence" may have a fairly fixed meaning in Hong Kong (or U.K.
law), there is no reason to assume that this is the precise meaning intended here.
124 Those who have acquired only "settled" or "landed immigrant" status appear to be unaf-
fected. A substantial number of those who can afford to are said to be seeking the insurance of
another right of entry. See, eg., Cheng, supra note 97, at 5-6. Cheng recounts that the Dominican
Republic gives a right of permanent residence to those buying land there, and citizenship to those
with six months residence; they opened an office in Hong Kong to publicize this. Id. In 1985, Mr.
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to conceive of other examples of greater or lesser plausibility. 121
In summary, it appears that while no precise meaning can be at-
tached to the "right of abode," almost all existing "belongers" will con-
tinue to be able to leave and will be able to return (which implies a right
to remain). However, the right to leave is bestowed "[u]nless restrained
by law [upon] holders of valid travel documents." '126 The latter condi-
tion, taken at face value, makes departure not a fundamental right, but
conditional upon documentation. The former condition is not inconsis-
tent with the imposition of a particular form of travel document (the exit
visa), but is not necessarily so sinister since similar words appear in U.K.
law.27 Nonetheless the issue of travel documents requires examination.
2. Travel Documents
The Elaboration expressly permits HKSAR residents to travel in
and out of the HKSAR using documents issued by the HKSAR Gov-
ernment, or "by other competent authorities of the People's Republic of
China, or of other states."' 28  The Elaboration envisages the HKSAR
Government issuing two sorts of travel instruments: passports and
"travel documents."' 29 Both are to be valid for "all states and regions"
and record "the holder's right to return to the [HKSAR]."' I Passports
are for "all Chinese nationals who hold permanent identity cards of the
[HKSAR]," whereas travel documents are for "all other persons lawfully
T.S. Lo, a prominent Hong Kong lawyer and former member of the Executive Council (who re-
signed over the nationality issue), set up the Hong Kong Freedom of Movement and Right of Abode
Ltd., a non-profit-making company designed chiefly to circulate information on emigration. For
reasons of confidentiality, it does not disclose information on the use of its services, but claims them
to be considerable. In any case, people from Hong Kong have long emigrated to Singapore, the
U.K. and elsewhere for economic reasons. For a discussion of the migration to the U.K., see HOUSE
OF COMMONS, SECOND REPORT OF THE HOME AFFAIRS COMMITrEE SESSION, THE CHINESE
COMMUNITY IN BRITAIN (1984-85) H.C. Paper No. 102; HOME OFFICE, GOVERNMENT REPLY TO
THE SECOND REPORT FROM HOME AFFAIRS COMMITTEE, Sess. 1984-85, THE CHINESE COMMU-
NITY IN BRITAIN, 1985, CMND. No. 9586.
125 One can, for example, become a "belonger" by marriage. HKIO, § 2(1), para. (a)(iv)
("Hong Kong belonger"); id. sched. 1, para. 2(c). Such a person holding a nationality other than
Chinese, and thus, presumably, holding a right of abode elsewhere, will fall into none of the catego-
ries. One can also become a belonger by descent. Id. para. (a)(iii), sched. I, para. 3(b). Such a
person who is not a Chinese national and with less than seven years residence or with a right of
abode elsewhere, will not either.
126 Joint Declaration, supra note 95, Annex I, § XIV.
127 See supra note 113.
128 Joint Declaration, supra note 95, Annex I, § XIV. Presumably travel documents may be
issued "by other states" only in the case of non-Chinese nationals, given the attitude of the Chinese
to dual nationality. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
129 Joint Declaration, supra note 95, Annex I, § XIV.
130 Id. The Central People's Government is also to assist in negotiations on visa abolition
agreements.
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residing in the [HKSAR]."' 13 1 Thus, the right of abode as such appears
to attract no entitlement to a passport.
1 32
There is also the question of who will receive travel documents as
opposed to passports. Recipients must be lawful residents, presumably
permanent ones, but with no link to another state likely to grant them a
passport.
13 3
The charitable conclusions are that there is some loose drafting, that
documentation is required to exercise the entitlements to leave and re-
turn, but that the requirement is in order to record rather than restrict
movement, and particularly that no exit visas will be required. This
would be consistent with the general imperative of maintaining confi-
dence. 134 But it is far from clear for whom the "non-passport" travel
documents are intended. Questions of the issue of travel documents (in
the generic sense) are very much left to the HKSAR Government.
3. Immigration Control
Section XIV of the Elaboration declares that the HKSAR Govern-
ment "may apply controls on entry, stay in and departure from the
131 Id.
132 A holder of a permanent identity card is similarly not entitled to a passport since a perma-
nent identity card is a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition. It is also unclear who will have, or
whether anyone will be entitled to, such a card. The Explanatory Notes assert that "[tihe SAR
Government will issue permanent identity cards to all those with a right of abode in the SAR." See
Explanatory Notes, supra note 95, para. 49. No doubt the existing practice whereby residents are
required and, thus, entitled to hold identity cards (or other means of identification) will continue, but
this is not made plain. It is unfortunate that the grant of such a document is apparently contingent
upon the grant of another. HKIO, pt. IV(A).
133 It appears from the Explanatory Notes that the ethnic minorities with the right of abode
are intended to receive travel documents. See Explanatory Notes, supra note 95, para. 50. The
Explanatory Notes also assert that ethnic minorities are likely to receive permanent identity cards.
See supra note 132. However, since the ethnic minorities are probably not Chinese nationals, they do
not fulfill the stated conditions. See supra notes 110-11 and accompanying text. Reinforcement for
this conclusion comes from the following paragraph of section XIV which declares that "[h]olders of
permanent identity cards of the [HKSAR] may have this fact stated in their travel documents as
evidence that the holders have the right of abode in the [HKSAR]." See Joint Declaration, supra
note 95, Annex I, § XIV. Thus, unless "travel document" is used in a different, generic sense, it is
being declared that those who are not Chinese nationals, but who use Chinese travel documents (and
thus possibly looked at askance by immigration authorities in third countries) will have the fact of
their right to return stated on those documents. But the term may, in fact, be being used in the
generic sense there, since the same paragraph contains a further reference to the entitlement of
HKSAR identity card holders to travel documents. Id.
134 However, inconsistent views from the P.R.C. have been voiced on various issues connected
with the liberalizing effect of impending transfer on internal government. It would, in any case, be
too sanguine to assume HKSAR residents will get passports with the ease to which residents of the
United Kingdom, or the United States, or Hong .Kong under the present regime are accustomed,
especially since British National (Overseas) passports will be in circulation by then. See infra note
150 and accompanying text.
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[HKSAR] by persons from foreign states and regions."' 135 Thus, control
over "aliens" is entirely delegated. Neither the Elaboration nor the Ex-
planatory Notes provide any express or implicit guidance on interpreta-
tion of immigration policy and procedure.
C. The U.K. Position on Nationality
1. Application of Precedents on Decolonization
The United Kingdom has considerable experience with decoloniza-
tion, including its nationality aspects. These precedents could have been
followed in the Hong Kong case, mutatis mutandis. Thus, all those
claimed by China as Chinese nationals could cease to be BDTCs on July
1, 1997, subject to an "expatriate clause."' 3 6 However, the Chinese pop-
ulation will not receive the new citizenship of their own state, but that of
an existing, alien' 37 one. Also, the principles could only be applied with
the "East African variation,"' 38 since Chinese nationality law finds it dif-
ficult to include ethnic minorities.139 They would thus be in a position
similar to their East African counterparts.14 Yet it would be anomalous
for the Hong Kong Chinese even to remain BDTCs, as the East African
solution would imply, since there would be no British dependent terri-
tory with which they were connected. China might also object to the
implication that Hong Kong remains a British dependent territory.
Logic would require the Hong Kong Chinese status to be transferred to
British overseas citizenship, the category more or less created for the
East African Asians.' In any case, all those losing BDTC status would
also thereby lose Commonwealth citizenship.' 42
2. Guarantees to the Local Population
It would not be surprising if at least some of the population sought
specific guarantees of their interests in the matter of nationality. These
interests reside as much in freedom of travel and in the symbolism of
135 Joint Declaration, supra note 95, Annex I, § 14.
136 Cf supra note 21 and accompanying text.
137 "Alien" in the technical sense of U.K. municipal law (i.e. not a citizenship of a Common-
wealth country). 1948 British Nationality Act, § 1(2). To people of Chinese origin it is clearly not
"alien" in the popular sense.
138 See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
139 This is because it operates essentially jure sanguinis. See supra note 46.
140 See supra notes 23-27 and accompanying text. In fact, they are in many cases almost literal
cousins, being part of the diaspora from the Indian subcontinent.
141 See supra notes 35 & 140 and accompanying text. China might also object to the implica-
tions of continued allegiance to the United Kingdom. For further discussion in U.K. municipal
terms, see supra note 3.
142 The significance of this might in some eyes be debatable, since it carries rights neither to
protection abroad nor entry to any territories whatsoever. However, in the United Kingdom it is
municipal citizenship. See supra note 41.
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nationality as in traditional concerns like protection abroad.
143
The United Kingdom, however, cannot give many meaningful guar-
antees in the face of Chinese power and jealousy on the subject, and is
unwilling to pursue any policy with immigration implications. On the
other hand, China wishes to maintain confidence, accepting the com-
promises involved.
3. The U.K. Solution-The "British National (Overseas)"
The aforementioned factors help explain the tenor of the U.K.
Memorandum, 1" and its implementation in the resulting legislation.
The U.K. Memorandum states that BDTCs by virtue only of a connec-
tion with Hong Kong will cease to hold this status on July 1, 1997,141
and that no one will acquire the status by virtue of such a connection
thereafter. 146 These persons can, however, "retain an appropriate status
which, without conferring the right of abode in the United Kingdom,
will entitle them to continue to use passports issued by the United King-
dom,"147 and their holders "will be entitled to receive, upon request,
British consular services and protection when in third countries."
148
The effects of this settlement are rendered into U.K. law by the
Hong Kong Act of 1985149 which deals with the nationality provisions in
a schedule. The schedule delegates power to the Government to imple-
ment the terms of the U.K. Memorandum, including creation of "a new
form of British nationality the holders of which shall be known as British
143 As noted, some residents are seeking a right of entry elsewhere as an insurance. See supra
notes 121 & 124. Articulation of such concerns could be muted by the lack of any tradition of
public, or even democratic, politics. It might also be muted by an ambivalence towards China on the
part of some of those of Chinese origin who might have doubts about past and present policies, but
are conscious of participating in the oldest continuous cultural tradition in the world.
144 See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
145 Exchange, U.K. Memorandum, supra note 95, para. (a).
146 Id. para. (b).
147 Id. para. (a). Paragraph (c) records that U.K. consular officials in HKSAR and elsewhere
will be able to renew and replace their passports. Id. para. (c).
148 Id. para. (d). This adds meaning to the phrase "appropriate status," but thereby also dem-
onstrates the extremely limited practical usefulness of such protection to its beneficiaries, for the vast
majority will be Chinese nationals and thus not capable of being represented against the Chinese
Government. See supra note 54. Diplomatic protection is not mentioned.
149 Hong Kong Act, 33 & 34 Eliz. 2, ch. 15 (1985). House of Commons debates can be found
at: 171 OFFICIAL REPORT, HOUSE OF COMMONS, Jan. 21, 1985, cols. 731-812 (2d Reading) (for
insights into the nationality part of the package from statements by the Foreign Secretary and by two
backbenchers knowledgeable on nationality law, though not necessarily in accord with the Govern-
ment; id. cols. 733, 792-6, 1046-7); 72 OFFICIAL REPORT, HOUSE OF COMMONS, Feb. 6, 1985, cols.
1029-76 (Committee Stage and 3d Reading). For House of Lords debates, see 460 OFFICIAL RE-
PORT, HOUSE OF LORDS, Feb. 19, 1985, cols. 481-598 (2d Reading); 461 OFFICIAL REPORT, HOUSE
OF LORDS, Mar. 14, 1985, cols. 233-248 (Committee Stage). For discussion of the Act as a whole,
see Wesley-Smith, The Hong Kong Act 1985, 1986 PUBLIC LAW 122.
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L LV
Nationals (Overseas) ["BN(O)s"],' '5 0 and giving the power to require
application for that status.' 5t These powers were exercised in the Hong
Kong (British Nationality) Order in Council of 1986.152
This Order in Council's import lies chiefly in implementation of the
relatively simple policy outlined. Its terms, however, are extremely com-
plicated because the complexity of U.K. nationality law makes it difficult
to define "connection with Hong Kong." '153 BN(O) status creates a
"gateway" to Commonwealth citizenship. 54
But why create a whole new nationality status? The obvious "ap-
propriate status" for the former BDTCs was either British overseas citi-
zenship as they will be the new "UK passport holders," or perhaps
British subjects without citizenship since that accurately describes their
position.155 Possibly both options were unacceptable to China, carrying
the implication that no real change had occurred.1 56 Also, why is ascrip-
tion of BN(O) status not automatic, but rather attained by application,
albeit as of right?15 1 Perhaps this is also to deflect Chinese jealousy on
the question of diplomatic representation, but it creates a problem.
4. A Consequential Complication-Statelessness
and the Extension of British Overseas Citizenship
All BDTCs by virtue of a connection with Hong Kong will lose that
status on July 1, 1997,5' though nearly all remain Chinese nationals.
Also all BDTCs may, upon application before that date, become
BN(O)s, 159 a status they retain for life. But what is the position of a
150 Hong Kong Act, para. 2(1)(b).
151 Id. para. 2(2). Powers to deal with consequential and transitional matters are in paragraph
2(3). Id. para. 2(3).
152 Hong Kong (British Nationality) Order in Council, S.I. 1986, No. 948 [hereinafter Hong
Kong Order]. This Statutory Instrument came into force on July 1, 1987, precisely ten years before
the transfer. It was first issued, after pressure, as a draft for discussion in Parliament as Cmnd. 9637
with explanatory notes. See supra note 85 (note that the explanatory notes are inaccurate in para.
24(a)).
153 See Hong Kong Order, art. 2. It also removes Hong Kong from the list of dependencies in
the 1981 British Nationality Act with effect from July 1, 1977, thus preventing anyone from acquir-
ing BDTC status by virtue of a connection with it after that date. Hong Kong Order, art. 5. There
are other consequential provisions.
154 Id. art. 7.
155 See supra notes 15 & 35 and accompanying text. BSWCs are now predominantly Irish
citizens (who have free entry into the United Kingdom).
156 There is also a U.K. propensity to create new categories to cover difficult circumstances,
which is most evident in the 1981 British Nationality Act.
157 The schedule to the Hong Kong Act of 1985, the source of power to create the status, did
not require an application, but merely permitted it.
158 Hong Kong Order, art. 3.
159 Id. art. 4. Those born between January 1 and July 1, 1997, have until Dec. 31, 1997, to
apply. Id. art. 4(2).
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BDTC who is not a Chinese national and fails to apply to become a
BN(O)? What is the status of a child born after 1997 to a BDTC who
becomes a BN(O) but who is not a Chinese national? 60 The brief answer
is that, if otherwise stateless, the Order provides that the person in ques-
tion automatically becomes a BOC."6' This apparent paradox is logical
insofar as there is a parallel in the case of East African Asians, and there
is no Chinese jealousy to contend with regarding such people.
There is a further, major paradox, however. These BOCs will have
children born in Hong Kong after July 1, 1997. So will BN(O)s who are
not Chinese nationals. Not having originally been BDTCs, the children
cannot become BOCs by their parents' route; not having Chinese na-
tional parents, they will not become Chinese nationals. They would thus
be stateless, at least at birth-indeed, so might their children, and subse-
quent generations.
Insofar as this position results from Chinese reliance upon the jus
sanguinis, it is a Chinese problem. Insofar as the existing BDTCs pres-
ently look to the United Kingdom, it is a U.K. problem. The solution
adopted by the United Kingdom is to make BOC status available auto-
matically to the first generation (i.e. those otherwise stateless children of
BN(O)s and BOCs),' 62 and upon application to the second generation
(i.e. generally those with a parent or grandparent, respectively, who was
a BDTC by connection with Hong Kong and who lost that status on July
1, 1997).63 There could, thus, be such BOCs living well after the year
2100!164
V. CONCLUSIONS ON THE NATIONALITY ASPECTS
OF THE SEITLEMENT
Once it was accepted that the United Kingdom was giving up con-
trol of Hong Kong, the broad outlines of the nationality provisions were
160 This question is pertinent since article 3 bestows British Nationals (Overseas) status only
upon those BDTCs who have a connection with Hong Kong and who apply before July 1, 1997.
161 Hong Kong Order, art. 6(1). There is a minor paradox in that British Overseas citizen
status was originally intended (subject to minor exceptions, see supra note 38) to be obtained only
upon the coming into force of the British Nationality Act of 1981 on Jan. 1, 1983, and thus to be a
finite and declining category from a date seventeen-and-a half years before this extension takes place
on July 1, 1997. See supra note 29.
162 Hong Kong Order, art. 6(2).
163 Id. art. 6(3)-(5). The drafting is complicated, mirroring section 17 of the 1981 British Na-
tionality Act. See 1981 British Nationality Act. Application is normally required within twelve
months of birth. Those failing to have an application made on their behalf will remain stateless. If
China treats them as having parents who are stateless or of uncertain nationality settled in China
under article 6 of NLPRC, then they are not stateless ab initio, and thus are ineligible for the U.K.
provision. See supra note 49.
164 It is likely that both U.K. and Chinese nationality law will have changed by then. Never-
theless, there will presumably have to be transitional provisions.
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inescapable. After July 1, 1997, China would control the land and popu-
lation, and the United Kingdom could have no pretensions to claim alle-
giance or offer protection, except by China's leave. That China already
claimed the population at large as its nationals makes no difference. In-
terest thus focuses on a number of subordinate themes. 165
A. Do the Arrangements Maintain Confidence?
Presumably the two signatories have confidence in the arrangements
although both were constrained in their negotiations. The settlement as
a whole was tested for its acceptability to the population of Hong Kong.
An Assessment Office was set up for this purpose and reported favora-
bly.1 66 Overall acceptance was tempered by concern on implementation,
and a minority had either expressed serious doubts or rejected the pro-
posals. 167 It may be assumed that this general support was partly due to
the maintenance of a nationality status termed "British."
On nationality stricto sensu, qualms were expressed on the removal
of BDTC status168 and the need for consular representation of BDTCs
and BN(O)s in the HKSAR.169  Concern was also expressed as to the
apparently "nebulous"17 ° nature of the concept of Chinese national sta-
tus and its application to those holding foreign passports and those of
mixed parentage. 171 Bitterness was felt towards the United Kingdom for
having agreed to strip millions of people of their nationality. This bitter-
ness partly reflected concern at the lack of an escape route, 172 such as
165 One theme inappropriate to deal with here, being a matter of distress for its practitioners
only, is the consequential effect of increasing the complexity of U.K. nationality law still further.
166 HONG KONG: ARRANGEMENTS FOR TESTING THE ACCEPTABILITY IN HONG KONG OF
THE DRAFT AGREEMENT ON THE FUTURE OF THE TERRITORY, CMND. No. 9407 [hereinafter As-
SESSMENT REPORT] (especially ch. 3). This Office was concerned with being viewed as independent
and accurate, and was itself subject to review by a Monitoring Team. (The Report of the Monitoring
Team was published with the Assessment Office Report, and declared the Team satisfied with the
Office's efforts). The Assessment Office conclusion mirrored opinion in the media, of representative
bodies, of individuals, and of a commissioned opinion survey. The lack of a tradition of public
debate is referred to above. See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
167 ASSESSMENT REPORT, supra note 166, paras. 3.19-.25.
168 Id. para. 4.65.
169 Id. para. 4.69.
170 The word is used in the Assessment Report itself. Id. para. 4.52. It is not explained and
may refer to the lack of any declaration of the rights and obligations of Chinese nationals (notwith-
standing the guaranteed rights in the first Annex to the Joint Declaration), although it is immedi-
ately followed by reference to the questions of foreign passports and mixed parentage mentioned in
the text.
171 Id. para. 4.52.
172 Id. para. 4.67. Paradoxically, some respondents argued that the existence of an escape
route would be enough, for few would use it. In other words, it would not be an escape route, but a
security blapket.
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entry to the United Kingdom, and partly reflected a sense of betrayal.' 73
It was also suggested that criteria for naturalization as a BDTC might be
relaxed to allow greater access to BDTC and BN(O) passports. 174
On the issue of the right to travel there was concern chiefly at the
lack of a clear statement of a right to emigrate, 7 5 and as to the accepta-
bility to third countries of BN(O) and HKSAR passports 17 6 (as well as
consular protection in HKSAR). 1 77
In addition, the Hong Kong Legislative Council requested some
amendments to U.K. law and practice.178 First, the Legislative Council
sought endorsement of BN(O) passports to show that the holder was en-
titled to seek entry to the United Kingdom to visit. This was readily
conceded undoubtedly because it is almost meaningless. 179  Second, the
Legislative Council sought a form of registration for Hong Kong BDTC
ex-servicemen wishing to become British citizens. Only small numbers
of Hong Kong people are affected, and the U.K. Government asserted
that they were effectively covered by existing legislation.'i 0 Finally, the
Legislative Council sought a similar concession for ethnic minorities.
This, the only major concession sought, was not acceded to. The Gov-
173 The Assessment Report recounts the following two individuals' comments: "With one
stroke of the pen you have stripped us of our identity and slotted us into racial categories-an
unforgiveable [sic] act.. ." and "I feel the oath of allegiance to the Queen [upon naturalization] to be
very serious and am disillusioned with what the British Government has done." Id. para. 4.66.
174 Therefore, "Chinese residents" might more readily become BDTCs and thus applicants for
BN(O) status and passports. See supra note 91.
175 ASSESSMENT REPORT, supra note 166, para. 4.53.
176 Id. paras. 4.54, 4.69. Also raised was the question of the maintenance of existing immigra-
tion quotas for Hong Kong in third countries, and of travel to countries not recognized by China.
177 See supra note 169.
178 6 OFFICIAL REPORT, HOUSE OF COMMONS, Apr. 24, 1986, cols. 146-48 (W.A.).
179 Id. No special entitlement to apply as a visitor is required except for Visa nationals, and
the United Kingdom requires such visas from comparatively few countries. For the immigration
rules, see HOUSE OF COMMONS, STATEMENT OF CHANGES IN IMMIGRATION RULES app. (No. 169,
1982-83). Immigration officials in the United Kingdom know prevailing law and practice without
need for such a reminder. The apparent concession relates to visits only, not to entry for settlement
which still requires an "entry certificate" (i.e. a visa). Id. pt. IV.
180 Id. About sixty ex-servicemen who served during the Second World War in the Royal
Hong Kong Regiment-The Volunteers (then known as the Hong Kong Defence Force)-were de-
clared eligible to register as British citizens under the curious section 4(5) of the 1981 British Nation-
ality Act, but with no promise of success. See 1981 British Nationality Act; supra note 40 and
accompanying text. The majority of those who so served are probably British citizens already, being
born in the United Kingdom or descended from a father so born, since it appears that only recently
have many people of Chinese origin been recruited. HONG KONG GOVERNMENT INFORMATION
SERVICE, HONG KONG: THE FACTS: ROYAL HK REGIMENT (THE VOLUNTEERS) (1986). About
270 others who served in the defense of Hong Kong, but who do not fulfill the requirements of
section 4(5) of the 1981 British Nationality Act, were also considered to be eligible for settlement on
arrival in the United Kingdom. However, they would not thereby become British citizens and
would presumably be required to have "entry certificates" like all others seeking settlement. See
supra note 179.
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ernment asserted that the settlement met their needs and that "British
citizenship would not strengthen the position of the [ethnic minority]
communities in Hong Kong."'
181
As to the question of maintaining the confidence of the rest of the
world, it is both too early to say and impossible to disentangle the nation-
ality provisions from other aspects of the transfer of sovereignty. Reac-
tion in Taiwan will be most important to watch.
B. Is China's Attitude Reassuring?
Since China regards U.K. control of Hong Kong as little short of
usurpation and considers that the population, with few exceptions, are all
Chinese nationals already, acceptance of BN(O) status was a reassuring
concession. The guarantees in relation to freedom of travel, though inex-
plicit, are significant. On the other hand, it would have required only a
tiny and costless further concession to permit BDTCs, not already Chi-
nese nationals, to register as such, thus avoiding the need for the tortuous
provisions in the U.K. legislation avoiding statelessness.
C. Has the United Kingdom Fulfilled Its Obligations?
This query begs many questions. On detailed matters it appears that
the United Kingdom could have been more generous. The principal ex-
ample is in relation to the status of ethnic minorities.
Also, a number of police and civil servants are apprehensive lest old
scores be settled under the new regime. Section 4(5) of the 1981 Act may
be applicable, but only at the Secretary of State's discretion.' 82 Further,
others are apprehensive since they are refugees from China and no provi-
sion caters to them.
It is also tempting to make a cynical comparison with the Falkland
Islands. 8 However, mere skepticism is the more sensible response.
Further, the reassurance implied by BN(O) status is somewhat illusory
for its holders since they cannot be protected against China, the only
state against which they are likely to require protection.184 The pruden-
181 Id. This seems disingenuous. In the Parliamentary session in 1986-87, the Home Affairs
Committee of the House of Commons examined the subject of "passport control." 247 HOUSE OF
COMMONS, FIFTH REPORT OF THE HOME AFFAIRS COMMITTEE SESSION, PASSPORT CONTROL
(1986-87) (May 7, 1987). This was prompted by the proposed Channel Tunnel to Continental Eu-
rope (now due to open in 1993). No doubt because of this limitation, no attention was paid to the
issue of passports and Hong Kong. It may well be that this Committee or another will consider
aspects of nationality, immigration and Hong Kong as 1997 approaches. See infra note 184 and
accompanying text.
182 See supra notes 40, 180. It is understood that a number of police have applied, but that
their applications have not yet been dealt with.
183 See supra note 98.
184 As noted (supra note 155), they are genuine, if not technically, UK Passport Holders and
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tial consideration of the confidence of others may have been at least as
important in the creation of BN(O) status.
With respect to the broad policy, however, there were few choices,
which implies that no blame attaches. Indeed, the Agreement itself, as
opposed to its detailed implementation in U.K. municipal law (still pris-
oner to a fear of "coloured immigration"), probably extracted as many
concessions as it could. Nevertheless, 3.5 million BDTCs and 2 million
aliens currently under U.K. protection are to be transferred to the con-
trol of another state, without requiring their consent.
British subjects without citizenship. See supra notes 15 and 28 and accompanying text. In an Ex-
change of Memoranda dated April 11, 1986 (but unpublished in the U.K.), the governments of the
U.K. and the P.R.C. noted and agreed that new identity cards would be issued in Hong Kong
differentiating between those with a right of abode and those without. Neither card specifies a re-
placement date and both would be used after 1997 until replaced by the HKSAR Government.
Furthermore, BN(O) passports are to be issued both before and after 1997 with an endorsement
declaring the right of abode in Hong Kong, where applicable and a permanent identity card number.
The replacement identity cards issued by the HKSAR Government will use the same number. This
seems a very cozy relationship.

